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Indonesia’s Stimulus Plan Draws Fire From Environmentalists and Unions

Critics say the sweeping measure near passage in Parliament would lead to greater deforestation and the loss of worker protections.

President Joko Widodo backs the omnibus bill as a way to attract investment and stimulate the creation of new jobs.
President Joko Widodo backs the omnibus bill as a way to attract investment and stimulate the creation of new jobs.Credit…Agus Suparto/Indonesian Presidential Palace, via Associated Press

By Richard C. Paddock and Muktita Suhartono

BANGKOK — Indonesia’s Parliament is on the verge of approving a sweeping coronavirus stimulus package that opponents charge would undermine worker protections and permit widespread destruction of the country’s rainforests.

The legislation is backed by Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo, and is seen as a way to attract investment and stimulate the creation of new jobs by reducing regulations on businesses. Its supporters hope to win passage before Parliament ends its session next Friday, even as opposition to the measure grows.

A confederation of labor unions is calling for a three-day national strike starting on Tuesday over provisions in the bill that would reduce job security, wages and mandatory days off. Union leaders say the strike has the backing of five million workers from dozens of industries.

Environmentalists oppose the measure because it would eliminate environmental reviews for many new projects and could lead to the destruction of primary rainforests that are essential in controlling carbon emissions and slowing climate change.

“The government is pursuing this policy as if they were completely deaf and blind to the effect on people by the emerging climate crisis,” said Phelim Kine, senior director for Asia at Mighty Earth, a global environmental campaign organization. “This is the Indonesian equivalent of ‘Drill, baby, drill.’”

Branded as an “omnibus bill,” the legislation is 1,028 pages long and would amend 79 laws and more than 1,200 articles. Supporters say it would improve Indonesia’s investment process by speeding regulatory approval and eliminating many permit requirements.

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“This is the key to facilitate investment, especially in terms of simplifying permits,” said Luhut Pandjaitan, a top cabinet minister whose portfolio includes investment.

Indonesia, the world’s fourth-most-populous country, has been hit hard by the coronavirus, which has pummeled the economy and threatens to overwhelm the country’s beleaguered health care system.

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The government was slow to adopt coronavirus restrictions this year, then quick to lift them in the hope of reviving the economy. Now, the country is nearing 300,000 confirmed cases, and its death toll — nearly 11,000 — is the highest in East Asia. Jakarta, the capital, has imposed a partial shutdown for the second time.

Indonesia’s economy is expected to contract this year for the first time since the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. The finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, has forecast a decline in the gross domestic product of as much as 1.7 percent this year.

Officials fear that the economic downturn — along with the closing of schools as a pandemic measure — will reverse the country’s recent gains in reducing poverty, improving nutrition and raising education levels.

Mr. Joko, in his second five-year term, has made economic development the focus of his presidency, often overshadowing other concerns.

The effort to push this bill through Parliament has given his critics a sense of déjà vu.

A year ago, as Parliament neared the end of its session, lawmakers attempted to push through legislation that would have sharply reduced personal freedom, including limiting free speech and prohibiting sex outside marriage, effectively banning gay and lesbian relations.

Thousands took to the streets in protest around the country, and five died in clashes with the police. Mr. Joko withdrew the measure, although he refused to block another contentious bill that weakened the country’s anticorruption agency.

This year, despite coronavirus restrictions making it harder to stage protests, labor organizers said they planned to demonstrate outside Parliament and invited students, environmentalists and other opponents of the measure to join.

The labor coalition supports the idea of job creation but argues that the omnibus bill would harm workers by reducing severance pay for those laid off, cutting the amount of mandatory leave, allowing longer work hours and permitting the hiring of contract and part-time workers to take the place of full-time employees.

“The fact is that the omnibus law reduces labor rights in the existing law,” said Said Iqbal, president of the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation and a leader of the planned strike.

Indonesia, which straddles the Equator and once had vast rainforests, has lost much of its forest cover to intentional burning that has been used for decades to clear land for palm oil plantations.

Forest fires occur every year and produce huge volumes of smoke that drift over neighboring Singapore and Malaysia and into the atmosphere, contributing to global warming. Environmentalists say that the government has made some progress in recent years in reducing the amount of burning, but that restrictions now in place would be reversed by the omnibus bill.

Especially vulnerable, they say, are four provinces in Sumatra and another on Java that still have intact primary forest and serve as natural carbon sinks that help protect against climate change.

Asep Komarudin, senior forest campaigner for Greenpeace in Indonesia, said the measure would gut forest protection, including by eliminating public input in the permit process and repealing laws that the government uses to sue companies for illegal burning on their land.

He noted that these provisions were drafted in the interest of corporations long before the pandemic and had nothing to do with the coronavirus.

“The government is offering investment by eliminating all the safety nets, meaning that everything has been put on sale,” he said.

Defenders of the measure say that the current environmental requirements would not be eliminated for large projects, just for smaller ones.

“If the business field poses low risks, then there would be no need for a permit,” said Ihsan Zulkarnaen, an official at the coordinating ministry for the economy. “They would only need to register.”

But critics said the lack of safeguards and the reduction in environmental protections could make foreign investors — especially those from Europe, where environmental standards are high — less interested in putting money in Indonesia.

“This is very damaging for our forest and for our environment,” Mr. Asep, of Greenpeace in Indonesia, said. If the bill passes, “all the effort to work on climate change and preventing deforestation will be futile.”More About IndonesiaWhen Learning Is Really Remote: Students Climb Trees and Travel Miles for a Cell SignalSept. 5, 2020As Amazon Smolders, Indonesia Fires Choke the Other Side of the WorldSept. 17, 2019Thousands in Indonesia Protest Bills to Limit Rights and Ban Extramarital SexSept. 30, 2019

Richard C. Paddock has worked as a foreign correspondent in 50 countries on five continents with postings in Moscow, Jakarta, Singapore and Bangkok. He has spent nearly a dozen years reporting on Southeast Asia, which he has covered since 2016 as a contributor to The New York Times. @RCPaddock

Muktita Suhartono reports for The New York Times in Indonesia and Thailand. She joined The Times in 2018 and is based in Bangkok. 

Climate Change: Pocket Guide to Capacity Building

Pocket Guide to Capacity Building under the UNFCCC – 2020 Edition

REVISED AND UPDATED. Your quick guide to the history of negotiations on capacity building under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the global institutional framework, and how global capacity building efforts can be improved. What can the UNFCCC do to promote long-term, sustainable capacity building where it is most needed? What has been done, and what remains to be done?

https://ecbi.org/index.php

Towards zero-carbon building

Eliminating carbon from the building and construction sector by mid-century will require radical transformation27th April 2020

Avoiding carbon-intensive materials: the seven-storey T3 office building in Minneapolis is North America’s largest contemporary wooden building. Only the ground floor and the central access core use reinforced concrete, while the top six storeys have been built with wood-frame techniques. © Michael Green Architecture

By Cristina Gamboa , CEO, World Green Building Council

In its 2018 landmark report, Global Warming of 1.5°C, the UN Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change warned of a catastrophic climate breakdown if global average temperatures rose by 2°C. Negative consequences for our communities and planet would be long-lasting and, in some cases, irreversible. Recent events in countries like Australia have shown us a glimpse of the future and that the worst, if we do not act now, is yet to come.

Faced with our current state of climate emergency, science and data have already established the role and potential of the building and construction sector in helping to map a pathway to 1.5°C in line with the more progressive ambitions of the Paris Agreement.

Underpinning those ambitions is a projected transition to net-zero carbon emissions with specific transformations to be met by 2030 and 2050. It is imperative that the sector steps up its climate action, as we know that the path of its decarbonisation is one of the most cost-effective ways to rescue our planet from the worst effects of climate breakdown.

As the world’s population increases, the global building stock is expected to double in size by 2060. Without drastic changes to the way our sector operates, this expansion will fuel an expected doubling of the total global consumption of raw materials (according to predictions by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). This will significantly increase the construction sector’s emissions and climate impact.

A wake-up call? Absolutely. That’s why at the World Green Building Council (WorldGBC) we see the need to go further and faster to decarbonise. And we want to take the whole sector with us.

Bringing embodied carbon upfront
Carbon emissions are released not only during the operation of buildings but also during the manufacturing and transportation of materials, construction and end-of-life phases of all built assets – buildings and infrastructure alike. Largely overlooked historically, these embodied carbon emissions account for around 11 per cent of all carbon emissions worldwide.

If we drill down further, we see that carbon emissions released before a building or infrastructure enters use (so-called ‘upfront’ carbon) will account for half of the entire carbon footprint of new construction between now and 2050. This upfront carbon therefore threatens a large chunk of our residual carbon budget, and it’s occurring right now.

As steps to reduce operational carbon take effect, embodied carbon will grow in both size and importance as a proportion of total emissions. While we continue to focus on addressing operational carbon, we must now also rapidly increase our efforts to tackle embodied carbon emissions on a global scale.

Our 2019 report Bringing Embodied Carbon Upfront describes goal-based steps that stakeholders across our sector can take to meet global climate targets against a staged timeline using a whole-lifecycle approach. The report – both a roadmap and call to action – is especially meaningful, as it is endorsed by some 85 organisations: from financial institutions and policymakers to developers and manufacturers.

These organisations join our global network of Green Building Councils, demonstrating leadership through global initiatives like our Advancing Net Zero programme, which targets full-sector decarbonisation by 2050. Our ambitious vision for the sector sees a highly connected value chain radically reducing both embodied and operational carbon emissions, improving wider lifecycle environmental impacts, and contributing as effectively as possible to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

Achieving our vision means taking urgent action to tackle upfront carbon, while planning with whole-life carbon in mind. It means ‘designing out’ carbon using more robust metrics and methodologies. It means innovating in materials to improve procurement options and maximise circularity. And it means initiating a fresh conversation between investors, policymakers, planners, developers, manufacturers and designers to better manage the supply- and demand-side influences on the built environment.

Designing for better outcomes
Today, increasingly smarter urban planning is maximising opportunities for low-carbon design in buildings and surrounding infrastructure.

When buildings are viewed as, for example, an energy source for electric vehicles, it’s clear that interdisciplinary boundaries are being crossed. Building design can therefore be part of a bigger picture that also takes in transport and urban planning.

It is worth reminding ourselves that low-carbon building design also considers future-use and end-of-life scenarios, maximising the potential for maintenance, repair, renovation and adaptation. Smart design for disassembly and deconstruction chooses and uses materials which can be recycled, or which can be extracted and separated easily for processing.

Meanwhile, latest-generation, performance-based metrics are raising the bar for design standards within new builds in a bid to eliminate the carbon emissions associated with operating costs. Here, the focus is on monitoring and measuring outcomes with greater reliability and rigour, and on using integrated design solutions to achieve net-zero emissions today while future-proofing for tomorrow.

In this context, our Green Building Councils are playing an increasingly active and important role. We recognise the value that rating tools and certification schemes have in different markets in support of performance standards that exceed local regulatory minimums. That’s why our Green Building Councils are already developing their own net-zero carbon building certification programmes tailored to local needs.

Such schemes help quantify reduced impacts while encouraging participants to consider enhanced sustainability criteria. Green Building Councils are also rolling out training and education programmes to develop market capacity and support delivery.

Material innovation
Materials are the principal source of embodied carbon emissions from buildings and infrastructure, particularly the upfront carbon being released right now. Winning the support of manufacturers and creating the right conditions for them to take radical action today and tomorrow are crucial.

Materials producers will need finance, and supportive policy frameworks, plus an adequate market demand for their low-carbon products. That is why the coordination of our efforts across the widest possible range of stakeholders is an urgent priority.

Highly carbon-intensive materials such as concrete and steel play a key role in shaping the built environment that we live in. They will continue to do so. Today, our focus must be on identifying and evaluating the best low-carbon solution for a building’s needs. That said, the good news is that forward-thinking manufacturers of our most carbon-intensive materials are leading the way in innovating for impact.

HeidelbergCement, the world’s fourth largest cement group, is the first company in this sector to design a carbon reduction strategy that is certified to be in line with the Paris Agreement. Dalmia, one of India’s top cement manufacturers, has made a commitment to becoming carbon negative by 2040. In steel, ArcelorMittal and SSAB are among manufacturers working to meet the Paris targets by, for example, using cleaner power, by exploiting circular carbon models, and by prioritising carbon capture and storage.

These types of innovations that reduce emissions from materials mean designers have better options. Indeed, the knock-on effect of advances in materials ripples out right across the sector.

Opportunity and challenge
Instilling a better understanding of best practice and the potential for change is key to embedding systemic progress towards our objectives – not just within our sector but across the entire planning and regulatory landscape. When so much of our attention is on the path ahead, it is vital not to underestimate the opportunities associated with our existing building stock – opportunities to upgrade, renovate and retrofit to improve performance across the whole lifecycle.

We can help buildings reach net-zero readiness via efficient on-site electrification – for example, in anticipation of a decarbonised grid. Nature-based solutions and offsets, too, can help shrink residual emissions.

Our vision is one of radical transformation for our sector. To deliver it requires much more market demand as well as a rapid scaling up of solutions by the supply chain. Demand-side actors within the production chain, including investors and developers, must work together with their counterparts on the supply side – the contractors and materials manufacturers.

By stimulating demand, we accelerate investment in actions that lead to increased competitiveness, improve access to innovative solutions, and stimulate action across a broader range of integrated strategies for achieving net-zero carbon – and for securing a safer future for both our generation and those to come.

Net zero is our goal. What does it really mean for us, if not the chance to transform our sector from a major cause of the climate emergency into a major solution to it?

Let’s Get the SDGs Back on Track: Insights from Latin America and Asia

Let’s Get the SDGs Back on Track: Insights from Latin America and Asia 

Photo by Channey on Unsplash

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

In Asia, countries from the lower-middle income ranges, such as Viet Nam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR have a long way to go towards SDG achievement, but the agenda remains a high priority for Asia-Pacific governments.

In Latin America, pandemic could generate the largest recession the region has experienced since 1930, but governments should not lose sight of environmental commitments as they develop emergency recovery measures.

We have identified three ways to get back on track in the SDGs Decade of Action, including a focus on well-performing SDGs for a sense of victory.

By Clemens Grünbühel, Ivonne Lobos Alva, Kuntum Melati, and Natalia Ortiz Díaz

The year 2020 marks the start of the Decade of Action and the countdown to the ten years we have left to transform our world and deliver the Sustainable Development Goals. It is a crucial period to speed up responses to the world’s greater challenges, now amid the coronavirus pandemic, one of the worst public health emergencies of our times with critical socioeconomic impacts.

The UN’s 2020 SDGs report announces that the world is not on track to achieve the goals by 2030. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, progress had been bumpy and then, the pandemic abruptly disrupted implementation towards many of the SDGs. In some cases, it has turned back decades of progress.

The environmental dimension of the 2030 Agenda needs to be secured, to support the progress of socio-economic targets.

The ongoing 75th UN General Assembly represents an opportunity to renew our commitment to improving the global state of sustainable development. But how do we get the 2030 Agenda back on track? The next ten years will require global efforts to focus and set priorities to avert falling short. This article explores perspectives from Asia and Latin America, and provides three concrete options to revert current downward trends.

Asia: Boosting Focus on Priorities

In Asia-Pacific, none of the 17 SDGs is tracking to be met by the 2030 deadline. The latest progress report on regional SDG baselines highlights that countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are already lagging. The report shows that progress on five Goals has deteriorated: SDG 2 (zero hunger); SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth); SDG 10 (reduced inequalities); SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities) and SDG 15 (life on land).

In the last Thailand elections, all parties supported some type of environmental and social equality agenda. However, nobody wants to pursue a set of unachievable goals. So, we need to focus on what can be achieved in the remaining decade. But focus on what? 

Speaking at the UNGA’s 75th general debate on 22 September 2020, China announced a pledge on “green recovery” aiming to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and peak its emissions before 2030. We look forward to seeing details from the region’s greatest emitter on how they will lead by example in adapting their policies and practices.

Earlier this year the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) published a report titled, ‘Fast-tracking the SDGs: Driving Asia-Pacific transformation.’ The authors categorize countries into four groups based on their efforts to undertake transformative change:

  • Fast risers (progress rapid but still a long way to go),
  • Sprinters (racing ahead),
  • Aspirants (slow rates of change), and
  • Last milers (good track record but slowing progress).

Interestingly, the report shows that countries from the lower-middle income ranges, such as Viet Nam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR are somewhat dominating as aspirants and fast risers, i.e. far from SDG achievement, while OECD and other high-income countries such as Singapore and New Zealand are in the sprinters and last-milers categories.

These results show that the development agenda remains high on the agenda of Asia-Pacific governments. While the region is industrializing rapidly, inequalities are rising, the rural-urban divide is increasing, poverty is rampant, and food and nutrition security remain yet to be resolved.

Latin America and the Caribbean: The Ultimate Dilemma

In June 2020, Alicia Barcena, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) announced the results of an analysis of progress using 72 statistical series for the for the region’s SDG indicators. She reported that of the 72 indicators, the region: has reached the target for four; ; is on the right track for 15; needs more public policy intervention for 8; requires strong public policy intervention for 13; is stagnant for 27, and is in decline for 5.

This bleak outlook is worsened by the expected effects of COVID-19. Estimates indicate the pandemic will generate the largest recession the region has experienced since 1930, with a projected growth of -5.3%, which would generate almost 12 million more unemployed and an increase of almost 30 million people in poverty.

Governments are rightly aiming to develop emergency recovery measures. However, they should not lose sight of environmental commitments and fall prey to the old dilemma: making a false choice between socio-economic relief and protecting the environment.

Furthermore, the stability of the region is at risk. An increase in unemployment, inequality, poverty, and hunger are ingredients for more social conflicts and unrest. We are already witnessing this in ColombiaChileBolivia, and Ecuador. In these four countries, massive protests against the governments broke out in 2019, and, in some of them, the police and military forces took to the streets to stop the demonstrations, resulting in dozens of deaths, hundreds of injuries, and social and political chaos. This has quieted down during the strict quarantines, but as isolation measures have softened, people have returned to the streets to protest the economic actions taken by governments and the lack of response to the ravages of the pandemic.

The potential instability ahead clearly reminds us that a resilient, inclusive, low-carbon economy must be the linchpin of post-Coronavirus economic recovery.

How Do We Get Back on Track?  

We have identified three ways forward.

Smart prioritizing and strategic synergies: Should we go for low-hanging fruits or push the underperforming SDGs? We believe in the need to set realistic targets as constant underperformance threatens to make the 2030 Agenda irrelevant. There is a need for success stories and not just the lingering feeling of underachievement. In this sense, smart prioritizing and strategic synergies would allow us to focus on well-performing SDGs for a sense of victory, but also on key Goals and key targets that are badly struggling, to spark a significant change to development pathways.

Focus on harnessing the environmental dimension of the SDGs: A recent study shows that only 20% of countries analyzed mention biodiversity as a national priority in their SDG progress reports. The Global Biodiversity Outlook 5 declares that biodiversity is declining and that none of the Aichi Targets will be met, thereby threatening SDG achievement and undermining efforts to address climate change. The environmental dimension of the 2030 Agenda needs to be secured, to support the progress of socio-economic targets.

Aim to understand how the SDGs work as an indivisible system: A danger of prioritizing is that we can lose sight of the integrated character of the 2030 Agenda. One way of reducing the risk of advancing some Goals at the peril of others is to keep an eye on potential synergies and amplification effects. It is crucial to mainstream systems thinking into SDG planning and to make use of the methods and tools that are developed to help policy developers understand the impact of their prioritization choices. SEI’s Synergies Approach allows policymakers to systematically review all potential interlinkages and to prioritize SDG targets and goals that can pull others forwards, with as little trade-offs as possible.

A Final Thought

Regardless of the current lamenting on how we will not be able to reach the goals in 2030, we do have to acknowledge how far they have taken us. Sustainability has become a bon mot in every part of society. Today, not only researchers and activist groups preach the sustainability gospel, it has reached the highest levels of government policy planning, it is part and parcel of business and city plans. Even habitual challengers, like the coal mining industry, are jumping on the sustainability bandwagon.

Let us act jointly and smartly, and not let the opportunity for real change slip away.  

This guest article is authored by: Clemens Grünbühel, Senior Research Fellow, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) Asia; Ivonne Lobos Alva, Research Fellow, SEI Latin America; Kuntum Melati, SDG Research Associate, SEI Asia; and Natalia Ortiz Díaz, Communications Officer, SEI Latin America.

Overview of recently adopted mitigation policies and climate-relevant policy responses to COVID-19 – 2020 Update

Dear colleagues,

We are happy to announce that we launched our newest update report on recently adopted climate policies titled “Overview of recently adopted mitigation policies and climate-relevant policy responses to COVID-19 – 2020 Update”.

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Direct link: http://bit.ly/NewClimate_GHG_mitigation_Oct2020

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***Description:

This report presents an overview of recently adopted climate policies, climate-relevant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and a state of play of NDC and LTS submissions in 25 countries and regions. The policy information compiled by NewClimate Institute, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is an update of a previous report published in June 2019, and supplements the December 2019 report on the projected greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under currently implemented policies and mitigation commitments.

***Key points:

The 2020 update report contains three sections with information on the following for 25 selected countries:

–    An overview of recent mitigation policies across all sectors

–   An overview of COVID-19 response measures, complemented with selected “green” and “grey” measures screened for climate impact

–   A state of play on updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and Long-Term Strategies (LTS)

This report includes over 60 mitigation policies that were adopted or under development between July 2019 and August 2020. Most policy developments are expected to contribute to GHG emissions reductions; however, we have also identified explicit policies that could increase GHG emissions in at least four countries. These include the expansion of fossil fuel exploration in Colombia, a stimulus to palm oil biodiesel production in Indonesia, potential mining in protected area in Brazil, and several proposed rollbacks of legislations and regulations set under the previous administration in the United States.

The report also provides an overview of COVID-19 response measures implemented in the 25 countries and regions and, where possible, identifies sustainable “green” measures and unsustainable “grey” measures. Our assessment indicates that, with exceptions of the EU and Republic of Korea, most countries have not implemented explicitly “green” recovery measures.

Countries are expected to formulate or submit their updated NDCs and long-term strategies well in advance of COP26 in 2021. Of the 25 countries assessed here, only Vietnam has officially revised its NDC target, whereas Japan resubmitted its original NDC target in March 2020. The European Commission has proposed a strengthened target for the EU of 55% emissions reduction below 1990 levels by 2030 (compared to 40% previously), but this target is yet to be approved.

Of the countries assessed, five have submitted their long-term strategies to the UNFCCC and five have developed drafts or domestically adopted strategies. Two of them, Japan and the EU, have submitted their long-term strategies with net-zero targets; Japan aims to achieve a decarbonised society as early as possible in the second half of this, while the EU aims for net-zero GHG emissions by 2050. In September 2020, China announced it would aim for net-zero carbon emissions by 2060—this objective has yet to be turned into a long-term strategy target.

***Links:

Direct Link: https://newclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/NewClimate_PBL-CLIMA_2020OctUpdate.pdf

Publication Page: https://newclimate.org/2020/09/29/overview-of-recently-adopted-policies-and-climate-relevant-policy-responses-to-covid-19-2020-update/

Project Page: https://newclimate.org/portfolio/enhancing-ambition-in-the-major-emitting-countries/

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency: www.pbl.nl/en/

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA): https://iiasa.ac.at/

***Contact NewClimate Institute:

Mia Moisio, m.moisio@newclimate.org

Takeshi Kuramochi, t.kuramochi@newclimate.org

***Contact PBL:

Michel den Elzen, Michel.denElzen@pbl.nl

For questions, please don’t hesitate to reach out to the contact persons or communications@newclimate.org

Victoria Fischdick | NewClimate Institute

+49 30 208492757 | v.fischdick@newclimate.org | www.newclimate.org

The Development of the Water-Energy-Food Nexus as a Framework for Achieving Resource Security: A Review

Front. Environ. Sci., 08 February 2019 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2019.00008

Gareth B. Simpson1,2* and Graham P. W. Jewitt2

  • 1Jones and Wagener (Pty) Ltd., Centurion, South Africa
  • 2Centre for Water Resources Research, College of Agriculture, Engineering and Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

This paper presents a study of the evolution of the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus since its rise to prominence in policy and development discourses in 2011. Drawing from an extensive review of published literature, the paper presents various interpretations of the concept while also considering the novelty of the WEF nexus. The challenge of integrating and optimising the components of this multi-centric nexus is examined, with four case studies being presented. Various criticisms levelled at the WEF nexus, such as the neglect of livelihoods and the environment in assessments, are noted, together with governance considerations associated with this framework. Finally, the potential of the WEF nexus to contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals is reviewed.

Introduction

Meadows et al. (1972) warned almost half a century ago, “If the present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.” Some three decades later they stated that “the human economy is exceeding important limits now and that this overshoot will intensify greatly over the coming decades” (Meadows et al., 2004). Just a few years after this latter statement, average world food prices increased significantly, leaving a large portion of the global population unable to afford their basic nutritional needs (Mohtar and Daher, 2012). These increased food prices are an indication of growing natural resource scarcity (Ringler et al., 2013).

The finite and indispensable nature of freshwater also came to the fore during the first decade of the twenty-first century. In their 2011 publication, Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus, the World Economic Forum highlighted that in many locations around the globe, water has been consistently under-priced, groundwater has been depleted, and that unlike energy, water has no substitutes or alternatives (WEF, 2011). However, Sachs (2015) states that “Of all of the problems of reconciling growth with planetary boundaries, probably none is more urgent and yet more complicated than the challenge of the world’s energy system.”

Projections are that the global demand for resources is going to escalate on this “hot, hungry, crowded, and fast evaporating planet” (WEF, 2011). The NIC (2012) estimate that the growth in demand for food, water and energy by 2030 will be 35, 40, and 50 percent, respectively. This is due to an increasing population, urbanisation, and an additional three billion middle-class people by 2030 (WWF and SABMiller, 2014). There is also a dire need to enhance the livelihoods of the “bottom billion” who are undernourished, without access to electricity and clean water (IRENA, 2015).

Speaking on World Water Day in March 2011, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban-Ki Moon, noted that the interconnects between water, energy and food are among the greatest challenges that mankind faces. In November of that year, the Bonn2011 Conference: Water Energy and Food Security Nexus–Solutions for the Green Economy was convened. That meeting served as a catalyst for wider interest in the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus amongst academics, policy makers, national and international development agencies and donor countries. While some authors suggest that the WEF nexus has traits of a “nirvana concept,” others have identified several shortcomings in nexus thinking, labelling it as an immature approach (Allouche et al., 2015).

In this review, search terms related to the paper’s title were entered into the EBSCOhost, Web of Science, Science Direct, and Wiley Online databases. These searches yielded 111, 212, 135, and 53 results respectively, i.e., a total of 511 academic papers. After removing duplicates (104), articles were excluded based on a review of their titles (284) and abstracts (38). A further 32 articles were subsequently excluded during a full screening of the texts, yielding 53 academic articles that have contributed to this literature review. Fourteen grey literature sources that were identified during the review of the academic articles were subsequently included in the literature review process. This methodology was followed to remove bias, as far as possible, from the selection of academic and grey literature for inclusion in the compilation of this manuscript.

This paper initially examines what is understood by the term “WEF nexus.” It continues to provide an analysis of whether the WEF nexus is a unique approach, or if it is simply a repackaging of an existing framework (even though a “repackaging” would not necessarily imply irrelevance). The challenge of integrating and optimising these three resource sectors, together with their trade-offs and synergies, is subsequently presented together with four case studies. Thereafter, one of the key criticisms levelled at the WEF nexus is considered, namely, whether the resource security goal of the WEF nexus, which the global economic community is seen to be driving, accommodates the environment and livelihoods. Finally, the possible benefits of the WEF nexus approach in terms of policy development and governance are reviewed.

What is The WEF Nexus?

The word nexus means “to connect” (De Laurentiis et al., 2016). This word conveys the interactions between two or more elements, be they dependencies or interdependencies. The WEF nexus is, therefore, the study of the connections between these three resource sectors, together with the synergies, conflicts and trade-offs that arise from how they are managed, i.e., water for food and food for water, energy for water and water for energy, and food for energy and energy for food.

Some authors argue that there is little agreement on the WEF nexus’ precise meaning, contending that there are many competing (and often overlapping) conceptions (Benson et al., 2015Al-Saidi and Elagib, 2017). Others suggest that the term can be viewed as a buzzword, i.e., a word that gains prominence due to “a combination of ambiguous meaning and strong normative resonance” (Cairns and Krzywoszynska, 2016). Gain et al. (2015) report that many developing countries are not even aware of the WEF nexus. Cairns and Krzywoszynska (2016) found that within natural resource discussions in the United Kingdom, the understanding and usage of the term WEF nexus is “plural, fragmented, and ambiguous.” Their concern is that the broad use of the term could trivialise its importance.

Wichelns (2017) states that the selection of water, energy and food as the principal components of a nexus framework for guiding research and policy, although initially appealing, is somewhat arbitrary. Liu et al. (2018) note that while the energy sector speaks of the energy-water-food (EWF) nexus, hydrologists and water engineers call it the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus, while those in the agricultural fraternity use the term, the food-energy-water (FEW) nexus. Based on this variance in terminology, it is evident that the conceptual approach to the WEF nexus is generally dependent upon the perspective of the particular researcher or policy-maker (Bazilian et al., 2011). Allouche et al. (2015) agree that the term can mean different things to different people, arguing that while some consider the WEF nexus scope to be too narrow, excluding for example climate change and the environment, other authors view it as being relatively broad and link it to the green economy, poverty reduction and global resource security (Pandey and Shrestha, 2017).

The World Economic Forum’s primary area of concern regarding the WEF nexus was initially water security, hence it is termed by some as the WEF security nexus. Different groupings who have embraced the WEF nexus approach have contrasting foci, e.g., sustainability, the green economy, trade-offs, livelihoods, climate, optimisation, modelling, or scarcity. Pahl-Wostl (2017) explains that the WEF nexus was strongly focused on resource security during the first four years after the Bonn2011 Conference, but since then the concept’s use has broadened to address interdependencies and integration to achieve the sustainable management of resources.

While there is disagreement on what the term “nexus” means, this is not the first term that the academic and development community has struggled to define. Meadows et al. (2004) note that sixteen years after the Brundtland Commission mainstreamed the concept of sustainability (Brundtland, 1987) the global society was still trying to agree on what the term meant.

The debate regarding the nexus’ precise meaning and application indicates that it is still an evolving concept (Allouche et al., 2015Pandey and Shrestha, 2017). While there are differing interpretations of this framework, de Loe and Patterson (2017) suggest that what is paramount is “nexus thinking,” as opposed to a specific strict definition of the WEF nexus.

Is the WEF Nexus Concept Novel?

Many authors question whether the WEF nexus approach is novel (Allouche et al., 2015Benson et al., 2015Muller, 2015Wichelns, 2017). The FAO (2014), for example, query whether the concept is just the “same old wine in new bottles,” or if it contributes something new to the sustainable development discourse. It is also questioned whether the nexus is complete with only three sectors being represented. Climate change, the environment, land, governance, urbanisation, waste, or livelihoods are some of the other components that could be, and are, assessed together with the trio of sectors that make up the WEF nexus. To this end, Wichelns (2017) queries the selection of the three resource sectors in the WEF nexus and the widespread recognition that the concept is receiving, noting that it is not yet an agreed and tested framework.

Benson et al. (2015) argue that many of the ideas presented in the nexus philosophy already appeared in other strategies which entered policy discourses in the 1990s. When sustainable development was first proposed, it was stated that population growth, food security, energy, the environment, and urban development “are connected and cannot be treated in isolation one from another” (Brundtland, 1987).

Muller (2015) explains that the 1977 United Nations conference proceedings reveal that the world at that time was fully cognisant of the interdependencies between water, food and energy. This is evident when reading the seminal work, The Limits to Growth, wherein it is highlighted that the five major areas of global concern identified “are all interconnected in many ways” (Meadows et al., 1972).

Cai et al. (2018) note that since the Harvard Water Program in the early 1960s there has been a drive to address water research utilising an interdisciplinary approach. Wichelns (2017) reports that the need for greater integration of research and policy discourse across sectors and regions was expressed in international meetings as early as the late 1940s. In terms of the interconnected nature of all subjects of study in the biosphere, Muir (1911) stated that “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.” There is truly “nothing new under the sun.”

If the WEF nexus is not novel, then why has there been so much interest in the approach from organisations such as the World Economic Forum, the World Wide Fund for Nature, the United Nations and global companies like the Coca-Cola Company and SABMiller? Wichelns (2017) suggests that much of the interest in the nexus is as a result of the concern of the impact of climate change on water, energy and food security. Rasul and Sharma (2016) are in agreement, noting that all three resource sectors are influenced by climate change and that they, in turn, each contribute to that impact as a result of their discharges and/or emissions. Pandey and Shrestha (2017) contend that the concept of the WEF nexus has gained prominence as a contemporary way to understand and approach sustainable development.

In terms of the governance of water, one framework that was formalised in the early 1990s was Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). IWRM was initially embraced as the silver bullet of sustainable development because of its integrated analysis of sectors and resources (Kurian, 2017). The United Nations included IWRM as a component of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Benson et al., 2015). Bogardi et al. (2012) however argue that IWRM on its own is insufficient. Benson et al. (2015) suggest that the WEF nexus framework exhibits some innovative elements, such as holistically integrating different policy sectors, and contend that it could be highly complementary to IWRM.

While several authors argue that the interdisciplinary nature of the approach is not new, the primary reason for promoting the WEF nexus approach above that of IWRM is that it is multi-centric, with each sector being treated with equal importance, while IWRM is water-centric (Allouche et al., 2015Benson et al., 2015Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev, 2016Gallagher et al., 2016Al-Saidi and Elagib, 2017Liu et al., 2017Owen et al., 2018). Cai et al. (2018) suggest that the WEF nexus may be accepted by a broader set of stakeholders than IWRM, especially those within the agricultural and energy sectors.

Integrating and Optimising the WEF Nexus

Some critics of the WEF nexus argue that the analysis of one resource sector is sufficiently complex, suggesting that integrating multiple resource sectors simultaneously poses an appreciable challenge (de Loe and Patterson, 2017). Wichelns (2017) concurs, contending that given the lack of success in implementing Integrated Natural Resource Management (INRM) and IWRM in practice, another call for integration should be questioned. It has however been suggested that the critique of IWRM is well-founded because it is perceived to underestimate the importance of administrative boundaries, with its focus being hydrological catchments (Kurian, 2017). de Loe and Patterson (2017) contend that IWRM has failed to achieve the goals for which it was intended. Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev (2016) agree, stating that the active promotion of a nexus approach could assist in solving the IWRM’s “water box problem.” Belinskij (2015) argues for utilising a nexus approach since it removes the institutional “silos” that are so prevalent in governance and policy circles.

Leck et al. (2015) warn that the multi-sector goal of the WEF nexus, with its associated trade-offs and interdependencies, could result in its downfall. They warn that although the nexus concept is attractive, it is challenging to implement. Yet, Wicaksono et al. (2017) argue that the fundamental notion of the WEF nexus has already been adopted in some regions and countries, although not necessarily under the banner of this framework itself. Daher et al. (2017), while acknowledging the complexity of modelling the nexus (i.e., computer-based modelling), emphasise that there is no one-size-fits-all model to address WEF-related issues. They continue to describe how localising and contextualising a nexus assessment will be vital to addressing trade-offs. An example of localising and contextualising the WEF nexus at a sub-national level is provided in “Case Study 1”.

Case Study 1:

The province of Mpumalanga in South Africa is the energy hub of the country. It is the source of significant coal resources and most of the fossil-fuel-based power stations that burn much of the coal. However, “South Africa has only 1.5% high potential arable soils (soils best suited for cash crop production), and 46.4 % of this total area is in Mpumalanga” (BFAP, 2012). The development of coal mines, especially opencast operations, is continually reducing the area of high potential arable soils in South Africa (Simpson and Berchner, 2017). The continued pursuit of fossil-fuel based energy dependency in South Africa is, therefore, threatening food security. It is also negatively impacting upon air pollution (Greenpeace, 2018) and water quality (McCarthy, 2011). A WEF nexus-based assessment of South Africa indicates that policy related to the accelerated implementation of renewable energy generation must be adopted if the nation is to move toward a low-carbon, sustainable future.

Another challenge for WEF nexus analyses stems from globalisation. The liberalisation of trade has meant that the interactions between water, energy, and food are very complex since materials and products are continually crossing international borders (Owen et al., 2018). Water moves between countries as an embedded component of food and other products as “virtual water” (Bogardi et al., 2012). Closely linked to the concept of virtual water is large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs). In order to secure their essential resources, several developed countries (e.g., the United Kingdom and Italy) have pursued LSLAs, predominantly in developing countries, such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique (Siciliano et al., 2017). These LSLAs are ultimately concerned with gaining access to land and water for energy (i.e., biofuel) and food production. What is concerning is that malnutrition and economic water scarcity often exist in countries where LSLAs have occurred. In so doing the wealthier nations, in seeking to secure resources for themselves through LSLAs, reinforce the concerns of several authors regarding the securitisation agenda, i.e., that livelihoods of the poorer members of the global society are neglected in the developed world’s pursuit of macro-scale resource security.

Quantifying the movement of virtual water between nations and regions is not the only challenge. Liu et al. (2017) suggest that the scientific challenge associated with the WEF nexus is primarily related to the myriad of data required to undertake the necessary analyses. Further, water, energy and food are measured in different manners, with each having their own units of measurement.

In addition to the data and integration challenges associated with the WEF nexus, there are multiple spatial and temporal scales within which this framework can be viewed. These scales influence each other (Garcia and You, 2016). In terms of the spatial extent, a WEF nexus assessment could be undertaken at a city, basin, national, regional, or global level. An example of a regional assessment is provided in “Case Study 2.” Although Muller (2015) questions the novelty and completeness of the WEF nexus, it is argued that what the WEF security framework does do is to move the spotlight of water resources management “from watersheds to problem-sheds, from what society should do for water to what water can do for society.”

Case Study 2:

With less than 5% of the world’s land area, South Asia has to feed about one-quarter of the global population (Rasul, 2016). To ensure food self-sufficiency, many South Asian countries have adopted policies that encourage farmers to increase food production, including the provision of subsidies for irrigation, energy, and fertilisers, and the guarantee of minimum prices for wheat and rice. This has resulted in an alarming rate of decline in groundwater levels since these subsidies have discouraged farmers from being efficient in their use of both water and energy. “Thus, a nexus ‘no-brainer’ is to review and identify candidates for the phase-out of subsidies on water, energy, land and food” (Ringler et al., 2013). Current water and energy charges are often too low to affect behaviour. The irony is that by providing water and energy for agriculture at a low cost, food security can itself ultimately be threatened.

Regarding the temporal nature of a WEF nexus study, an instantaneous snapshot of the status of a WEF system could be developed. Alternatively, the metabolism of a city could be provided over a period, such as a month or a year. A further challenge related to seeking to optimise the WEF nexus is that a researcher could focus on human needs, trying to attain an equilibrium, while neglecting environmental considerations, climate change or poverty alleviation.

Although much of the literature associated with the WEF nexus is dismissive of the “silo” approach to resource management, some argue that “the baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater.” Wichelns (2017), for example, notes that there are times when an in-depth study within a particular discipline is required. Artioli et al. (2017), however, suggest that the momentum that the WEF nexus approach has attained within policy circles will be difficult to curtail.

Does the WEF Nexus Address Resource Security for All?

Gupta (2017) contends that the WEF nexus is a security nexus for societal well-being. Indeed, Hoff (2011) in the background paper for the Bonn2011 Conference highlighted the “need to secure local livelihoods and the non-negotiable human rights to water and food.” Wichelns (2017) however, argues that livelihoods are often omitted in WEF nexus analyses, even though the poorest members of the global society are often impacted most severely by the policy changes that emanate from a nexus approach. This is because the achievement of food security at the household, city, provincial, or country level is more complex than balancing supply and demand on a macro-scale (Grafton et al., 2016).

There is an emerging resource security focus utilising the WEF nexus as the guiding framework which is motivated by the possibility that economic growth will soon be constrained by shortages of one or more of the sectors constituting this nexus (Salam et al., 2017). There has also been an increasing focus on water security within the private sector during the past decade (Leck et al., 2015), and Green et al. (2017) note that the private sector is often influential in decisions appertaining to the provision and management of water, energy, and food.

Spiegelberg et al. (2017) agree that there is a general economic motivation behind the WEF nexus, explaining that the literature focuses primarily on three fields of global growth, namely, the increase in population, urbanisation, and the burgeoning middle class in developing countries with their “Western” consumer demands. Biggs et al. (2015) go further, stating categorically that nexus frameworks have failed to adequately incorporate livelihoods into their thinking, i.e., resource security for all. They suggest that this is counterintuitive since supporting livelihoods is implicit in the attainment of sustainable development. This relegation of livelihoods is in conflict with one of the three guiding principles of the WEF nexus philosophy highlighted at the Bonn2011 Conference, which is that people and their basic human rights must be the basis of this approach (Salam et al., 2017).

Leese and Meisch (2015) suggest that whereas sustainability has historically focused on distributional justice, it is now often viewed in terms of resource security. The risks associated with the unavailability of water, energy, and food have become a global concern (WEF, 2011NIC, 2012). Leese and Meisch (2015) argue that the WEF nexus’ focus on securitisation, i.e., the security agenda centered on the risk of non-supply, is one that is driven by economic considerations, not the challenges related to livelihoods, which has traditionally been within the ambit of sustainable development. Further, they contend that the sustainability focus on equitable access to resources is being usurped by the threat to global productivity and living standards.

In summary, the concern of these authors is that sustainability is being securitised, i.e., one component of sustainable development is being focused upon to the detriment of the other components. The belief is that the World Economic Forum is prioritising this agenda and that improved macro-scale food security will not ipso facto result in a reduction in the prevalence of undernourishment, i.e., Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2. Nor will improved water security at a national level necessarily lead to an increase in the levels of access to clean water and improved sanitation facilities, i.e., SDG 6. Biggs et al. (2015) explain that “security” should not refer only to the availability of resources, but also to universal access to them.

Salam et al. (2017), however, contend that the amalgamation of water, energy, and food in a nexus framework to increase resource efficiency can be considered as a necessary way to achieve the SDGs. Rasul and Sharma (2016) agree, stating that the nexus outlook can assist in aligning the SDGs with planetary boundaries. The SDGs provide a basis upon which the WEF nexus can be developed (Gallagher et al., 2016).

To sustainably achieve resource security for all, the integrity of ecosystem services and the associated resource base must be maintained while access to resources is expanded and consolidated. This is presented schematically in Figure 1, where all the SDGs are directly or indirectly connected to food. Rockström and Sukhdev (2016), who developed this illustration, propose that the goals for eradicating poverty (SDG 1) and hunger (SDG 2) require gender equality (SDG 5), adequate jobs (SDG 8), and a decrease in inequality (SDG 10).FIGURE 1

Figure 1. A way of viewing the Sustainable Development Goals and how they are all linked to food—reproduced from the Stockholm Resilience Center with permission (Rockström and Sukhdev, 2016). All the SDGs are directly or indirectly connected to food. The goals for eradicating poverty (SDG 1) and hunger (SDG 2) require gender equality (SDG 5), adequate jobs (SDG 8), and a decrease in inequality (SDG 10).

Ringler et al. (2013) explain that assessments utilising a nexus approach must consider both livelihoods and the environment. de Grenade et al. (2016) comment that while the “nexus” has various key strengths, it fails to adequately acknowledge the environment as its irreplaceable foundation. Planetary boundaries are however being threatened (Rockstrom et al., 2009) as predicted by Meadows et al. (1972). The challenge is to develop policies that support the sustainability of water, energy, and food resources, while simultaneously providing access to these resources for all levels of society. Achieving sustainability necessarily requires that the protection of the environment be prioritised.

Governance Considerations Associated With the WEF Nexus

It could be said, “let us eat, drink, spend, extract and pollute, and be as merry as we can, and let posterity worry about the spaceship earth” (Boulding, 1966). A philosophy such as this would fly in the face of sustainable development, which calls us to ensure that the needs of the current generation are not met in a manner that compromises the ability of our children to meet their own needs (Brundtland, 1987). Achieving a profound goal such as this requires a practical, holistic framework, and strong governance. Al-Saidi and Elagib (2017) suggest that a governance focus is a missing ingredient in the nexus debate.

Governance of the WEF nexus includes a wide range of private and public systems that manage the supply and demand of water, energy and food (Pahl-Wostl, 2017). Providing access to improved water sources, sanitation facilities and electrification is viewed by most citizens as a barometer of good governance and is reflected in both the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and SDGs. Benson et al. (2017) argue that effective governance for the nexus occurs when the integration of resource sectors is actively pursued, such that synergies between water availability, energy generation and food production are enhanced, while trade-offs are managed, and potential conflicts are averted. An example of the management of a WEF nexus trade-off, and the dissipation of a potential international conflict, is presented in “Case Study 3.” Although the WEF nexus approach has gained significant momentum since 2011, it is however not yet widely adopted in either policy or development planning (Wicaksono et al., 2017).

Case Study 3:

In a WEF nexus assessment of the Mekong basin it was determined that a significant growth in the capacity and supply of power through hydropower developments could, amongst other impacts, reduce fish stocks and fish diversity, as well as the availability of water to downstream users (Smajgl et al., 2016). A policy of managing energy demand, as opposed to a focus on energy supply and capacity alone, could reduce the negative impacts of hydropower on food and water security within this large river basin. This policy intervention recommendation would probably not have been arrived at if a single-sector energy assessment, as opposed to a WEF nexus assessment, was undertaken.

Rasul and Sharma (2016) state that the nexus framework and climate change adaptation share aims and principles. Rasul (2016) suggests that one mechanism for enabling a policy framework for managing nexus challenges is to strengthen the role of the national planning commissions in the countries being assessed. This is necessary even in developed countries. Sharmina et al. (2016), for example, notes that most of the United Kingdom’s land-use policies are compartmentalised, with the administration of the sectors occurring in silos.

Schreiner and Baleta (2015) in turn report that the nexus philosophy is becoming an important component of development planning, with synergies existing across international boundaries within a region. Ololade et al. (2017) concur regarding the potential of regional cooperation, although they note that even though South Africa’s policy allows for the implementation of a WEF nexus approach, this form of integrated governance does not yet exist at a national level. Individual countries will need to develop their own WEF nexus governance structures before they can engage in international endeavours in this regard.

In terms of the spatial extent of nexus governance, Artioli et al. (2017) note the rapid rate of urbanisation worldwide, and suggest that cities can play a key role in adopting the WEF nexus approach. They further state that the urbanisation of the nexus approach is part of a movement toward integrated management and that the “smart city” is the most dynamic component of that general trend (Artioli et al., 2017).

Another aspect associated with WEF nexus governance is waste. Machell et al. (2015) explain that it is possible to sustainably supply and consume more water, energy and food by addressing the mechanisms of waste. Scanlon et al. (2017) agree, noting that scarcity in these three key resources can be partially managed by reducing demands. An example of the benefit that could be derived from the processing of waste is provided in “Case Study 4”.

Case Study 4:

Machell et al. (2015) suggest that waste is an indispensable component often neglected in WEF nexus analyses and include waste as the fourth core component in their nexus framework conceptualisation. An example of waste reclamation, presented by Walker et al. (2014) suggests that urine separation could possibly recover 47% of the nitrogen from the food consumed in London. This could potentially yield an income of $33 million per year from fertiliser production. This practice would reduce waste, provide revenue that will contribute to water treatment costs, and provide a key resource for use within the agricultural sector.

Pandey and Shrestha (2017) conclude that the WEF security nexus is widely accepted in international development circles. (Dawoud, 2017) emphasise that the challenge is how to implement a WEF nexus framework where the risks, challenges and opportunities are identified and considered by all relevant stakeholders. As Brundtland (1987) stated over three decades ago, “The real world of interlocked economic and ecological systems will not change; the policies and institutions concerned must.”

The WEF nexus has also become important in both the drafting and the subsequent monitoring of the SDGs (Biggs et al., 2015). It could be said that the SDGs provide a test for the nexus approach (Ringler et al., 2013). Salam et al. (2017) argue that the interconnections between the SDGs emphasise the need for a nexus approach to achieve these goals. Boas et al. (2016) suggest that the nexus approach, together with its incorporation of the SDGs, is key to understanding why it has garnered such interest within the sustainable development fraternity.

Conclusions

The WEF nexus has been widely promoted in policy and development circles since 2011. This framework has potential strengths. It however also faces challenges if it is to be widely adopted.

In terms of possible weaknesses associated with the WEF nexus, a concern identified in the literature is that livelihoods and the environment are often omitted from these assessments. WEF nexus studies have, to date, to a large degree focused on global macro-scale resource security. This was not the intention when the concept was first promoted. For this framework to gain traction, particularly in light of the SDGs, it must be utilised to achieve adequate resource security for all, thus “leaving no one behind”. It must simultaneously acknowledge and protect the environment as the irreplaceable foundation of the nexus.

A multi-centric approach will add complexity, especially when interconnections, trade-offs and drivers are incorporated into the assessment. The fact that a WEF nexus approach cannot be a one-size-fits-all model means that it must be scaled and/or modified (sometimes significantly) for different assessments, e.g., cities, countries, and regions, which is viewed as a weakness by some. The availability of complete, relevant data also poses a challenge to the practical implementation of the WEF nexus. The WEF nexus is a relatively new and developing framework.

While the nexus concept is not novel, novelty is not a prerequisite for relevance. If the multi-centric WEF nexus approach provides a better means of addressing the complex development and security challenges that the global community is facing than existing frameworks such as IWRM, then its potential adoption should be explored further. The WEF nexus framework is considered by many authors in both academic and grey literature as holding promise for guiding policy development and governance structures in a world that is facing climate change, population growth, and inequality in terms of access to resources. The linking of WEF nexus assessments with the SDGs is therefore imperative.

Author Contributions

GS wrote the manuscript in consultation with GJ, who supervised the project.

Funding

This work is based on the research supported in part by the National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant Number: 114692). GJ’s academic position at the University of KwaZulu-Natal was supported by Umgeni Water through the Umgeni Water Chair of Water Resources Management.

Conflict of Interest Statement

GS is employed by company Jones & Wagener (Pty) Ltd.

The remaining author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Keywords: water-energy-food nexus, framework, resource security, governance, sustainability development goals

Citation: Simpson GB and Jewitt GPW (2019) The Development of the Water-Energy-Food Nexus as a Framework for Achieving Resource Security: A Review. Front. Environ. Sci. 7:8. doi: 10.3389/fenvs.2019.00008

Received: 02 September 2018; Accepted: 15 January 2019;
Published: 08 February 2019.

Edited by:Richard George Lawford, Morgan State University, United States

Reviewed by:Nitin Kaushal, World Wide Fund for Nature, India
Xueliang Cai, IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, Netherlands

Copyright © 2019 Simpson and Jewitt. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Gareth B. Simpson, simpson@jaws.co.za

Present Address: Graham P. W. Jewitt, IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, Delft, Netherlands

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2019.00008/full

Nature for Life: Galvanizing Political Will

Photo Credit: Michael Gallagher

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

The world has lost 68% of all wildlife populations since 1970.

We need action at all levels to redefine our relationship with nature towards constructing a nature-based planetary safety net.

This article provides updates on progress in five areas: Committing to Financing Nature; Reversing Biodiversity Loss by 2030 Through Global Commitment; Creating a Nature-Based Planetary Safety Net; Greening Covid-19 Recovery Efforts and Creating Green New Deals; and Mapping Nature for People and Planet,

By Jamison Ervin and Midori Paxton

We are facing a planetary emergency – a nature crisis, a climate crisis, and an inequality crisis all at once. Yet the world’s level of ambition to tackle our nature crisis to date has been lackluster, with a recent report highlighting that the world has failed to achieve most of the global biodiversity ambitions that the world agreed to in 2010, as part of a decade-long strategic plan for nature.

The result of low levels of leadership and political will in implementing the global plan, along with ever increasing threats to ecosystem and biodiversity coming from economic sectors, has been predictable – a recent report on the state of biodiversity found that the world has lost 68% of all wildlife populations since 1970. 

Funding an ambitious post-2020 global diversity framework requires eliminating “negative money.”

To fully respond to this emergency, we need bold ambition, commitment, and action at all levels, from local to global, and across different sectors and constituencies. We need a multi-pronged “whole-of-society approach” to redefine our relationship with nature towards constructing a nature-based planetary safety net.

This article provides updates on progress in five areas.

Committing to Financing Nature

Funding an ambitious post-2020 global biodiversity framework will require a significant increase in financial resources from all sources, including official development assistance, governments’ domestic budgets, climate financing directed to nature-based solutions, philanthropies, corporations, and new sources of revenue. 

It also requires eliminating “negative money.” For example, hundreds of millions of dollars are spent every year as agriculture, fisheries, and other subsidies to incentivize activities that degrade or destroy nature. All told, the finance gap for protecting 30% of the planet is about USD700 billion a year. However, a new report shows that this finance gap is not as large as it seems – it accounts for just under one percent of global GDP, and is a tiny fraction of the USD5.2 trillion we spend in fossil fuel subsidies. Moreover, the benefits of protecting nature outweigh the costs by at least 5:1. The best investment ever!

Reversing Biodiversity Loss by 2030 Through Global Commitment

Global, national, and sub-national leaders can no longer ignore our planetary crisis. Indeed, more than 1,700 jurisdictions have already declared a climate emergency. Now world leaders have begun to mobilize around a pledge for nature. More than 50 heads of state have already signed a pledge for nature, and 30 more are in the process of endorsing.

Among other statements, this pledge includes a recognition of the nature crisis, and calls for an expression of the need for a profound re-commitment from world leaders to take urgent action. To accompany this commitment, the Club of Rome has developed a concrete plan to emerge from our emergency.

Creating a Nature-Based Planetary Safety Net

The year 2021 will see the agreement by the world’s governments on a bold biodiversity framework through 2030, with an eye towards a planet in harmony with nature by 2050.

Building on the indivisible relation between the wellbeing of people and the wellbeing of nature, the 15th Conference of Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP 15) will begin by looking back to the past decade, identifying reasons for hope in national and local action on biodiversity. COP 15 will then look forward, identifying key elements required for achieving success, including bold political will, coherent and aligned government policies, integration and alignment of a wide range of economic sectors, adequate resource mobilization, and decisive action, among others.

Greening Covid-19 Recovery Efforts and Creating Green New Deals

COVID-19 has taught us that business as usual is no longer an option. This crisis highlights the socio-economic threats and costs posed by our planetary emergency, and offers an opportunity to accelerate the transition to more inclusive, greener, and more resilient economies. Decisions made now on how to stimulate growth, respond to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and prevent the next pandemic will determine the future health, well-being, and stability of both people and the planet.

To take action, countries can:

  • “green” their stimulus packages and longer-term national recovery plans;
  • promote green public work programs;
  • redirect harmful fossil fuel and agricultural subsidies;
  • integrate nature-climate concerns into agriculture, water resources, forestry, tourism, industry, mining, energy, and infrastructure; and
  • promote sustainable public/private finance and investments.

Mapping Nature for People and Planet

More than 2,200 satellites circle the earth, enabling humanity to monitor the planet in ways never imagined possible. Enabled by the UNDP-led UN Biodiversity Lab, governments are beginning to use spatial data from these satellites, and combine these datasets with local and national data to generate new insight.

Supported by UNDP, and with funding from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Government of Sweden, and One Earth, five governments – UgandaCosta RicaPeruKazakhstan and Colombia – have initiated a new process, called Mapping Nature For People and Planet: Essential Life Support Areas. Using satellite data, local and national data, and the principles of systematic conservation planning, these governments are able to pinpoint where actions on nature protection, restoration, and sustainable management will help them meet their nature-dependent national development goals, especially for water, food, climate, livelihoods, safety, and biodiversity. As Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, the new head of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Francis Ogwal, co-chair of the working group on the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, explain in a recent blog, such maps are an essential component for planning, implementing, and monitoring bold ambition and action on nature.

2020 was supposed to be a ‘Super Year for Nature.’ But even though all major biodiversity events have been postponed or cancelled, the recent gains in these five trends give us reasons for hope. To learn more, and for a dose of hope, visit www.NatureForLifeHub.org.

The authors of this guest article are Jamison Ervin, Manager at the UN Development Programme’s Nature for Development Global Programme, and Midori Paxton, Head of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, UNDP.

RELATED EVENTS

IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development – Negotiators’ Handbook

By Howard MannAaron Cosbey, Konrad von Moltke, Luke Eric Peterson on April 27, 2005

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The current model for International Investment Agreements (IIAs) was developed 50 years ago in a political and economic context that bears little resemblance to today’s, and designed for a much narrower role than such agreements now play.

Many critics believe that the current international investment regime is flawed beyond repair, and argue for the complete dissolution of the regime and its replacement with a regime specifically focused on the obligations of transnational investors. IISD shares many of the concerns, but has taken a different tack, proposing a new model for IIAs with rights and obligations for investors, home states and host states—a model consistent with the goals and requirements of sustainable development and the global economy of the 21st century.

This publication contains the full text of IISD’s Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, with an article-by-article commentary explaining in clear language the intent and nuances of the text. It is essential reading for negotiators of IIAs struggling against the current model to craft agreements that will serve their national interests. But it is also written to engage a wider audience of stakeholders concerned about the future path of international law and globalization.Share this page:

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Howard MannAssociate & Senior International Law AdvisorAaron CosbeySenior Associate

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https://www.iisd.org/publications/iisd-model-international-agreement-investment-sustainable-development-negotiators

How much soy is hiding in your supply chain?
The Soy Toolkit
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Our Programme Director, Sophie Higman, spoke at the edie Sustainability Leader’s Forum 2020, discussing ‘Embedded soy in the average shopping basket’ alongside Emma Keller, Head of Commodities at WWF and Laurence Webb, Responsible Sourcing Manager at Tesco.

SOY: THE HIDDEN INGREDIENT  

The average shopping basket contains cooking oil, margarine, chicken, bacon, fish and cat food among other things. These all need soy to be produced – be it as an ingredient or to feed the animals that go into these products. In fact, 70–75% of the world’s soy ends up as feed for chickens, pigs, cows and farmed fish. 

This mean these products all have a soy footprint. But, does this also mean a deforestation footprint?  

Recent research attributes 13% of all deforestation in Latin America to the expansion of soy. It’s considered the 2nd most important deforestation driver on the planet, after cattle ranching. 

This hidden ingredient in your shopping basket – or your company’s supply chain – could be associated with environmental and social issues, including deforestation, labour rights infringements and land conflicts. 

UNDERSTANDING THE SOY FOOTPRINT 

Which products in your supply chain might have a risky footprint?

To gain a broader sense of a company’s exposure to soy, and therefore soy-related issues, Sustainability and Sourcing teams need to start by analysing the soy footprint of their supply chain to understand how much embedded soy is in a given product.

For chicken, estimates range from 0.383 per kg of carcass weight (Consumer Good Forum, 2016) to 0.958 per kg (Profundo). 

McDonald’s has developed their own Soy Calculator which has helped them answer these questions for their own chicken supply chain and to plan for further engagement with their suppliers. Proforest is partnering with them on this journey.

Once a company has an idea of its soy footprint, what can it do to ensure it is not associated with social and environmental issues and, if it is, how to address them? 

TAKE ACTION – THE SOY TOOLKIT 

Proforest has developed the Soy Toolkit: a one-stop-shop of resources to support companies on their sustainable soy sourcing journey. The Soy Toolkit gathers a very wide range of resources companies can build on to ensure soy is responsibly produced and sourced.

We provide a 5-step framework to support companies with the implementation their soy policies:  

  1. Assess and plan implementation
  2. Understand supply chain risks
  3. Engage suppliers
  4. Establish a purchase control system
  5. Monitor, verify, report 

Within each element of the framework is a thorough review of relevant initiatives – this includes tools that are appropriate for companies far from the production level such as retailers and food or feed manufacturers. 

One such tool to help you understand supply chain risks is the Soy Scorecard developed by WWF. These publicly available scorecards allow you to have a broad understanding if a company you buy from has a procurement policy and programme in place to ensure soy is not associated with environmental and social issues.

If suppliers are not managing risks in a way that meets your policy or commitment, you can prioritise them for further engagement and agree on action plan.

Further still, the Soy Toolkit can help you to monitor progress. We provide examples of good practices on reporting and real examples of what companies are doing.

https://www.soytoolkit.net/embedded-soy-supply-chain

Mount Everest visible from more than 120 miles away after coronavirus lockdown clears the air

Breathtaking photos show Everest from 124 miles away for the first time in years.ByJoseph Guzman

istock

Story at a glance

  • The Nepali Times posted the photos to social media last week, saying stay-at-home orders due to the pandemic have resulted in some of the cleanest air over Nepal in years.
  • The photos taken from Chobar in Kathmandu Valley show clear skies with a view of the white Himalayan ranges and an arrow identifying the famous 29,029-foot mountain peak.
  • More than 450 coronavirus cases have been confirmed in Nepal with three deaths.

Stunning photos of Mount Everest have been captured from 124 miles away as coronavirus lockdowns in the region have led to a drop in air pollution, making the world’s tallest peak visible from the Nepalese city of Kathmandu for the first time in years, according to the Nepali Times.

The Nepali Times posted the photos to social media last week, saying stay-at-home orders have resulted in some of the cleanest air over Nepal and northern India in recent memory. 

The photos taken from Chobar in Kathmandu Valley on May 10 by photographer Abhushan Gautam show clear skies with a view of the white Himalayan ranges and an arrow identifying the famous 29,029-foot mountain peak. Everest is located on the border between Nepal and Tibet.


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Nepal announced this week an extension to its nationwide lockdown until June 2. All movement on roads, by vehicle and on foot, is currently prohibited with very limited safety exceptions. More than 450 coronavirus cases have been confirmed in Nepal with three deaths, according to Johns Hopkins University data. 

Worldwide lockdowns prompted by the pandemic have shown what happens to the skies when millions of people stop driving, flying and are confined to their homes. A recent study published in Nature Climate Change found that between January and early April, global daily carbon dioxide emissions decreased by about 17 percent compared to average levels last year.

https://thehill.com/changing-america/sustainability/environment/498941-mount-everest-visible-from-more-than-120-miles